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Abstract:  
 
Tens of thousands of British military personnel traveled in former Yugoslavia as 
peacekeepers between 1992 and 2007. The settlements where British forces established their 
military presence and supply chain were conceptually far from former Yugoslavia’s tourist 
sites, but military travelers made sense of them by drawing on the commonplaces of previous 
travel accounts and the lessons of pre-deployment training.  
 
British military travelers constructed themselves as often frustrated helpers in Bosnia who 
struggled with political limitations on their activities but found satisfaction in improving 
socio-economic relations at the level of the immediate community. For troops, long otiose 
periods in a stabilizing and startlingly cheap country engendered a touristic sensibility. This 
paper draws on published memoirs and more than fifty new oral history interviews with 
British peacekeepers and their Bosnian employees to illustrate how British military travelers 
drew on, perpetuated and changed the patterns and representation of British travel to the 
Balkans. 
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Since 1992, when the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) entered Croatia, tens 
of thousands of British military men and women have traveled to former Yugoslavia. The 
troop contribution that began with one field ambulance and several military observers in 
Croatia became dozens of infantry and cavalry battalions, combat support regiments, logistics 
units, headquarters establishments and individual postings as the UK became one of the 
multinational force’s lead nations in ‘the Balkans’. British troops served in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH) until 2007, implementing and monitoring the Dayton Peace Agreement 
and experiencing the changeover from UNPROFOR to its NATO replacements, IFOR 
(Implementation Force) and SFOR (Stabilization Force). Another force gathered in 
Macedonia in 1999 before entering Kosovo. During the 2000s, British forces gradually 
handed over their responsibilities in former Yugoslavia to European Union and NATO allies. 
However, in the confusing decade between the end of the Cold War and the origins of the 
War on Terror, Britain’s most significant operational deployment was to this very region. 
The sudden growth in published travel accounts of south-east Europe and its crisis zones 
during and since the 1990s has led scholars to analyze representations of ‘the Balkans’ in 
journalism, literature and film, narratives very often framed as accounts of real and imagined 
travel by a westerner. The most recent research on travel writing and the Balkans has also 
opened the dimension of European travel by south-east Europeans themselves (Bracewell and 
Drace-Francis ed. 2008). A focus on published travel writing, however, restricts the field to 
the small number of travelers who submit their work for publication. For instance, the British 
officers’ autobiographical narratives in Claire Duncanson’s article on peacekeepers’ 
constructions of masculinity are three books and one article in a strategic studies journal 
(Duncanson 2009). Other memoirs published between 1993 and 2010 include those of 
battalion commanders (Stewart 1993; Barry 2008), one battalion’s composite memoir (Royal 
Welch Fusiliers 1995), a fictionalized SAS account from Goražde (Spence 1999), and a study 3 
of military liaison partly drawing on the author’s own experience as a British liaison officer 
in 1995 (Chalmers 2001). There are strong grounds also to consider the memoir by the 
photojournalist Anthony Loyd (1999) quasi-military as well journalistic: the troubled narrator 
served in the Royal Green Jackets before traveling to BiH and from the outset interpellates 
the reader as a person able to recognize and sympathize with a professional military 
subjectivity.  
This paper draws on oral history interviews with fourteen British military personnel, 
collected by the author among fifty-one interviews for a research project into foreign 
languages and peacekeeping,
1 supplemented by further oral histories collected by others and 
stored at the Imperial War Museum (IWM) sound archive and by the corpus of published 
memoirs above. It seeks to compare the experiences of personnel whose missions compelled 
them to make sense of BiH’s politics, culture and language while staying for six months or 
more: negotiation and consent, so important to the peacekeeping concept, made almost all 
military tasks intercultural, interlingual encounters; as Robert Rubinstein (2008: 90) writes, 
‘the essence of peacekeeping is in the many individual actions taking place each day between 
peacekeepers and the people they are deployed to help’. The participants range from military 
interpreters and language instructors to forward air markers and Royal Electrical and 
Mechanical Engineers (REME). Their narratives span many locations, duties, objectives and 
political phases but share common features of travel encounters: a pre-deployment 
familiarization phase, arrival in BiH through a neighboring country, the experience of work, 
the experience of leisure and the journey home. Oral history is as vulnerable as memoir, 
perhaps even more so, to exaggeration, self-effacement, concealment and unconscious 
processes of forgetting, making it a problematic but fascinating resource for research about 
the past.
2 Both sets of military travel accounts discussed in this paper, the published and the 
recorded, conform to the conventions of travel narrative. The circumstances of their 4 
production, on the other hand, diverge: whereas published works emerge from creative and 
commercial negotiations with editors, agents and others,
3 in oral history the researcher and 
interviewer performs the work of mediation. 
Analyzing these military narratives presents the same problem faced by, for instance, Jean 
and John Comaroff (1991) in their study of Nonconformist missionaries in the colonization of 
South Africa: the rationale for the travel and presence of the texts’ authors was based on 
individually deeply-felt values and convictions yet was implicated within a wider scheme of 
unequal global power relations. Indeed, should one follow Stef Jansen (2006: 190) in 
critically conceiving of international organizations’ work in BiH as a project to remake a 
consciousness based on privatized capitalism after the fall of socialism, the comparison 
would develop a further layer. A case such as BiH throws up a further ethical difficulty in 
that the authors of narratives are still alive and, in the case of accounts personally collected 
by the author, that they contributed their narratives in sympathy with the overall aims of the 
project (to research the impact of languages on peace operations in BiH). How, then, to 
reconcile what are often accounts of individual achievement and learning with what may be a 
far less rosy structural perspective? Historicizing narratives of travel and movement requires 
the historian to take into account their role in constructing a certain form of knowledge and 
ultimately in supporting certain orders of relations that have practical effects on people’s and 
peoples’ political and economic power (Pratt 1985). Military travelers had privilege not only 
in their foreignness – endowing them with hard currency, the ability to leave, and the comfort 
of a secure home abroad – but in their equipment, their training, and their legalized power to 
defend themselves by force. The Comaroffs come to describe their own field of study not as 
‘a simple exercise in domination and resistance’ but as ‘a dialectic, mediated by social 
differences and cultural distinctions […] founded on an intricate mix of visible and invisible 
agency’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 28). The efforts to engage, understand, withdraw or 5 
reject that appear in the narratives below were slices of this dialectic, moments of benefit, 
detriment or both within a structural context that even some of its participants have come to 
doubt. 
 
Making sense of Bosnia 
 
‘Bosnia’ was a little-known country to most foreign soldiers, unless they could make sense of 
it within the ‘Balkans’ frame (as the post-Yugoslav conflict flowed from Croatia through BiH 
to Kosovo) or relate it to peacetime travel: Sarajevo had hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics 
and Bosnia was near holiday destinations in Croatia. Several British interview participants 
introduced the Croatian coast while situating the region in their narratives. ‘People used to go 
on holiday to Yugoslavia before the war,’ said Louise, a Royal Army Educational Corps 
captain and military interpreter who served in 1993–94. ‘It was what people did, a beautiful 
country.’
4 Eric, an Intelligence Corps reservist trained in Serbo-Croat in order to join a UK-
based team debriefing refugees in 1992–93, contrasted the resort to the war zone while 
describing his language course: ‘the vocabulary was very much geared, not to your holidays 
in Dubrovnik, but very much to what was happening in Banja Luka.’
5 The language (fast 
becoming the languages) of BiH was even more inaccessible to most military travelers, with 
the exception of soldiers and officers who volunteered for crash courses organized by the 
Defence School of Languages (DSL) at Beaconsfield. Serbo-Croat, like all other east 
European languages, had taken a distant back seat to Russian in UK higher education, 
meaning that the Army contained only one graduate speaker and three heritage speakers 
when the Yugoslav conflict began.  
Research into western representations of ‘the Balkans’ was inspired by and has developed 
since the aftermath of these very conflicts – beginning with the work of Milica Bakić-Hayden 6 
and Robert Hayden on equivalents of Orientalism in Yugoslav political discourse (Bakić-
Hayden and Hayden 1992) and Maria Todorova’s reminder that the very term ‘the Balkans 
conflict’ was a misnomer because it only involved successor states of Yugoslavia (Todorova 
1997). The travel writing scholar Andrew Hammond has argued that, from the 19th century 
onwards, Anglo-American travelers to the Balkans adopted a cynical and denigratory gaze 
that made foreign rule appear indispensable (Hammond 2007: 247). Hammond suggests that 
later authors were able to emulate imperial Victorian travelers by testing their ‘heroism and 
endurance’ in the Balkans, and that in the 1990s the mode of chaotic and violent 
representation was transferred from the Yugoslav wars to post-Communist social crises in 
other Balkan countries (Hammond 2007: 234, 267). The paradigmatic British military 
traveler to the Balkans in the 20th century was the Special Operations Executive agent 
Fitzroy Maclean, whose memoir Eastern Approaches was reissued by Penguin in 1991 when 
the Yugoslav crisis first came to international attention. Hammond’s reading of Maclean 
implies that the Balkans were of significance to him primarily as an arena where the military 
traveler could hone masculine virtues (just as passage through the South African landscape 
served primarily to the Comaroffs’ missionaries as a site of self-transformation (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1991: 174)): 
 
what Maclean is commending [in a description of shaving with snowmelt and a 
mess-tin] are the positive qualities that he feels the region has nurtured in himself: 
namely,  competence,  simplicity,  masculinist  flair  and  active  participation  in 
‘gallant struggle’ and ‘comradeship’, a typical combination in these wartime texts. 
(Hammond 2007: 202). 
 7 
The Army as an institution was still keen to draw on Maclean’s knowledge in 1992, when he 
was flown to Zagreb to brief a British reconnaissance party before it entered BiH.
6 
In the 1990s, British public knowledge about Yugoslavia was disseminated through 
television news and through several categories of book: reportage; new histories by 
academics, journalists and diplomats; translated fiction that reshaped the canon of Yugoslav 
literature for an audience seeking the origins of what it supposed to be a deep-rooted ethno-
religious conflict; and ‘classic’ accounts of travel to the Balkans often republished by 
opportunistic publishers. Ivo Andrić’s historical novels, depicting struggles between Muslim 
state officials and Christian townspeople in Ottoman Bosnia, appeared as high-street 
paperbacks and provided first experiences of Yugoslav literature for many interested Britons 
(this author included). Equally important literary works, such as Miroslav Krleža’s novels 
about the Croatian middle classes between the World Wars, remained in limited print runs or 
untranslated. The historian Brendan Simms (2002: 179–80) argues that familiarity with one 
‘rabidly Serbophile travelogue’, Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, combined 
with ‘half-remembered military history’ of Serbs’ part in the Second World War to 
predispose British officers to an ‘instinctive professional fraternalism’ with Bosnian Serbs. 
The generalization cannot be applied to all British personnel, whose reactions could range 
from sympathy with a side they perceived as the underdog or victim to a cynical moral 
equivalence equally antipathetic to all parties in the conflict. It nonetheless shows that travel 
writing and popular memory of history may both have a direct impact on soldiers’ 
understandings of conflicts and of the regions to which they travel.  
While British diplomacy’s early-1990s sanctions policy most disadvantaged 
Bosniaks/Bosnian Muslims and the Sarajevo government, public sympathies lay with that 
very side based on a huge volume of media reports between the discovery of the Omarska 
concentration camp in 1992 and the fall of Srebrenica in 1995. Troops, however, had to serve 8 
in territory controlled by Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats and win all three populations’ trust, 
according to the ‘hearts and minds’ theory already structuring overseas military operations. 
Indeed, after Dayton, the new British area of responsibility (AOR) was designed to include 
land straddling the Inter-Entity Boundary Line between BiH’s two constituent entities, the 
Federation and the Republika Srpska. Tony French, an artillery officer whose regiment joined 
one such post-Dayton deployment, was tasked with briefing his enlisted soldiers on Bosnian 
history and culture. With guidance from the Army training team, Tony chose to instill an 
ethic of impartiality and counteract any sympathies troops might have built up as members of 
the public. He compared the situation to Northern Ireland, where the regiment had previously 
expected to go:  
 
So actually, it’s a bit like Northern Ireland. We’re not saying that, you know, the 
Catholics are bad, and – I’m a Catholic, for instance – but, you know, Catholics 
are bad and Protestants are good. Definitely not that. You spend most of your 
time trying to give a balanced view, because sometimes we have to sit on the 
fence, and it’s very hard if you start giving those little nuances to soldiers. They 
can, particularly when they’re by themselves, they could do something not too 
good.
7 
 
Interpreting BiH through the lens of Northern Ireland, however, had its risks in wartime. 
Brendan Simms’s argument that Britain should have taken a far stronger moral stand in BiH 
sees Northern Ireland as an ‘unfortunate analogy’ that led officers to value equivalence and 
separation from the HQ UNPROFOR level downwards, to the dismay of the US general 
Wesley Clark: ‘when they transposed that into Bosnian terms what happened, at least over a 
period of time, was the UN didn’t want to take sides’ (Clark in Simms 2002: 181).  9 
Pre-deployment training always included some historical and cultural content such as the 
briefing discussed above; its main focus, however, was preparing soldiers for military tasks 
through ‘special-to-theatre’ training, developed through regular feedback from trainers who 
had been serving in BiH. During Operational Training Group (OPTAG) exercises at mock 
villages in the UK or Germany, soldiers practiced rules of engagement, role-played situations 
at uncooperative local checkpoints, rehearsed evacuation drills and learned procedures should 
they encounter unexploded mines. A ‘use of interpreters’ module delivered by DSL was 
quickly included following feedback that the first Britons carefully trained to speak ‘Serbo-
Croat’ had been under-used because their superiors had had unrealistic expectations of their 
skills. Native speakers of the local language – DSL’s civilian language instructors, Bosnian 
refugees hired by the day and local interpreters flown in from BiH itself – played civilians 
and improvised scenarios within the trainers’ general script. Ben Barry’s recollection of his 
battalion’s training as ‘astonishingly realistic’ (Barry 2008: 56) is a typical OPTAG memory 
– suggesting, at least, that nothing they encountered or remembered in BiH had made them 
doubt the content of the package, though showing no sign that training had encouraged 
reflexivity or (as Robert Rubinstein (2008: 12) warns of the ‘travelers advice’ training model) 
challenges to the concept of one’s own and others’ culture as fixed and static.  
In the work of readying the personal and collective self for new conditions, cultural and 
linguistic training was only one element, and preoccupied soldiers no more (or much less) 
than the practical aspects of preparing to deploy: acquiring kit, ‘special-to-arms’ weapons 
training, learning the rules of engagement and anticipating the likely climate. Geoffrey, a 
reservist who volunteered for full-time service in late 1995 and was posted to IFOR HQ at the 
Ilidža hotel complex in Sarajevo, recalled that his induction: 
 10 
involved  medical  tests,  dental  tests,  inoculations,  being  equipped,  and  certain 
elements of training, like firing, zeroing weapons, and becoming more used to 
some weapons which one wouldn’t otherwise perhaps be armed with, for example, 
the pistol. And waiting, really, for clothing and equipment to arrive […] although 
I was given various items of kit which I never used. I mean, an Arctic-weight pair 
of gloves, for example, and a face mask to keep the cold out. Obviously, living in 
a hotel as I did, that wasn’t the sort of thing I needed.
8 
 
Entering theatre 
 
The first actual British military travel to BiH since SOE missions during the Second World 
War (besides short visits defense attachés are likely to have made during Tito’s Yugoslavia) 
was a UK Land Forces reconnaissance mission in August 1992 in preparation for 
contributing an armored infantry battalion to UNPROFOR. The party, including the only 
British officer (a captain) with a degree in Serbo-Croat, initially flew to Belgrade and tried to 
enter eastern Bosnia but were turned back before Zvornik, a border town where Serb 
paramilitaries were massacring non-Serb residents. A week later, entering central Bosnia 
through Herzegovina, the party established the major sites of the British presence in BiH until 
Dayton: a battalion base at Vitez, company bases in Gornji Vakuf and Tuzla, a logistics base 
in Tomislavgrad and the rear brigade headquarters inside Divulje Barracks, a complex in 
Split rented from the Croatian Army. Divulje Barracks was quickly nicknamed ‘Slipper City’ 
after another comfortable rear base in Northern Ireland, as Louise explained: 
 
[when] people were indoors they wouldn’t wear their stout leather army boots, 
but they would wear desert, you know, can’t remember what they’re called, we 11 
called them desert wellies but do you know what I mean?, little sandy-coloured 
suede comfortable shoes, hence Slipper City, and people based at HQ and Slipper 
City were always frowned upon by those at the sharp end.
9 
 
Narratives of transit through Split often included uncomfortable flights in Hercules aircraft 
and hassles with Croatian border police, but also the experience of staying temporarily in an 
attractive city oriented towards tourism. Geoffrey, for instance, constructed it as a location of 
coastal beauty with historical precedents for military leisure: the nearby town of Trogir was 
‘actually an architectural gem, if that is your bag, with so much marble it’s all over the 
pavements’, where a French officer had ordered a leisure islet built during the Napoleonic 
Wars (suggesting a certain continuity between the British peacekeeping presence and the full 
French occupation of the Adriatic coast).
10 The barracks itself contained many bars operated 
by different British regiments, including the Royal Engineers’ bar, the setting for anecdotes 
told by both Louise and George (a REME lieutenant in 1998). For Louise, the ‘Rorke’s Drift’ 
bar (commemorating an Engineer lieutenant who commanded the defense of Rorke’s Drift; 
the name inscribed the mythic battle of colonial warfare into the 1990s Balkans) had been the 
site for an encounter that exposed the distance between the British military culture of 
irreverent humor and local Croatian norms of patriotism. A Croatian flag on display above 
the bar turned out to have been stolen and a visibly emotional Croatian liaison officer 
demanded its return: 
 
I said [to the Engineer who had taken the flag], ‘OK, flag, Rorke’s Drift bar, did 
you steal it? (laughs)’ ‘Well, yeah, you know (laughs) soldiers do, soldiers take 
flags.’ ‘OK, go and get it right now.’ So he went and got it, brought it back, 
Stefan [the Croatian officer] was crying and trembling. And he took the flag like 12 
a newborn baby, and he folded it in a very special way that only someone who 
knows about their national flag can fold, and it ended up in a nice little packet, a 
triangle, and took it away. And we got away with it.
11 
 
By the time of George’s tour in BiH six years later, dozens of units (thousands of troops) had 
established leisure routines taking in the diversions of ‘DJ Barracks’ as well as the Army’s 
official adventurous training centre on the Croatian island of Brač: indeed, he remembered 
‘[y]ou’d try and get down to Divulje Barracks, in Split, because there was a bit of a holiday 
camp.’
12 His own Engineers’ bar story (remembering the forfeits and ‘booby-traps’ that had 
made the bar popular among soldiers from all units) placed the base’s relationship with the 
local population into the background, foregrounding nuances of regimental identity that 
structured the meaning of belonging to the British Army.  
British soldiers departed from Split along the Main Supply Route and experienced the 
transition from coastal resort to remote mountainous conflict zone, witnessing the remains of 
the built environment in the countryside and the constant threat of Bosnia’s dangerous roads 
and drivers. A diarist in Ben Barry’s battalion was typical of memoirists and interviewees 
alike in his comments on Bosnian roads: 
 
Bosnian driving provided amusement, and often danger.  If there is a  Bosnian 
Highway Code, then it is almost a reverse of the British one. In Bosnia it would 
seem to be mandatory to overtake on blind corners, especially if driving a packed 
coach on icy roads at night. (Barry 2008: 70) 
 
Using the roads – or the skies, where apocryphally hard-drinking Czech pilots offered 
helicopter rides Britons did best to turn down – confirmed one’s departure from the 13 
predictable safety of the rear into the operational space of uncertainty, violence and threat. 
The last stage of the journey into theatre, entering the small and remote Bosnian garrison 
towns for the first time, then carried overtones of forcing one’s way into new territory: 
forward bases were sometimes described as located ‘up country’ and one interviewee referred 
to the small hamlets in his unit’s AOR as ‘remote village[s], where they hadn’t seen any 
Europeans for years’. Entry-into-theatre transport narratives such as the diary quoted by 
Barry problematically attributed danger to an inherent quality of the Bosnian drivers rather 
than, for instance, the extreme weather, the condition of the vehicles or the impact of the war 
and lack of governance on the capacity to maintain roads and signage. Such ‘manners-and-
customs’ description, writes Mary Louise Pratt (1985: 139–40), tends to serve as a 
‘normalizing force’ reifying and stabilizing the reality and ideology taken by the author to go 
without saying: in this case, the impression that the (essentialized) Bosnian subjectivity is 
thrill-seeking, amusement-worthy and even ‘a reverse of the British’. It is ironic to consider 
that, in the sociologist Béatrice Pouligny’s fieldwork on local attitudes to peace operations in 
countries including Haiti, Cambodia, BiH and Kosovo, ‘problems of driving on the roads and 
accidents caused by international staff [my emphasis] generally came at the top of the list’ 
(Pouligny 2006: 168), and that serious injuries caused by the poor driving of military vehicles 
were the single greatest source of resentment towards the foreign force expressed by Bosnian 
interpreters in this author’s own research. 
Like these military narratives, the missionary narratives studied by Jean and John 
Comaroff also customarily began with a travel phase, and one that focused on the narrating 
self rather than the context it was entering: 
 
[T]he essential rite of passage into the African reality was the overland trek from 
the coast to the interior. As they edged away from the comforting civilities of the 14 
Cape  Colony  toward  territory  unknown,  these  latter-day  crusaders  sought  a 
reference  point  for  their  grand  visions  on  the  ‘empty’  landscape.  But  what 
appeared to them as a featureless desert was, as we have seen, a country colored 
by a history of social conflict, one in which they were already cast in an equivocal 
role. Far from a slumbering wasteland awaiting their benign attentions, it was an 
arena fraught with struggle between colonial factions for control over indigenous 
resources, especially human capital. (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991: 173)  
 
The Bosnia narratives too contained a passage from ‘comforting civilities’ to an interior 
along one mapped, known and secure path. Some interviewees, whose responses might last as 
long as fifteen or more uninterrupted minutes, produced this type of account without 
prompting. Where the author as interviewer had to ask more questions, she too became 
implicated in producing a narrative of travel and movement. Even though this questioning 
stemmed partly from an awareness of literature on travel to the Balkans and partly from a 
question guide adapted from previous military oral history projects at the IWM, the 
interviewer too becomes complicit in supporting the interviewee to constitute himself/herself 
as a traveler and in failing to challenge the silences of the first-person travel frame.  
 
On and off duty 
 
What did soldiers think they were in the Balkans to do? Those who contributed their memoirs 
to historical record by publishing books or taking part in this research project usually 
depicted their tours of duty in compassionate terms – the will to make a difference they were 
sometimes not allowed to make. One civilian language instructor, a Sarajevan woman living 
in the UK, described her military students in 1993 as motivated by a sense of activism with 15 
which she sympathized: ‘they were eager to go there and to do something, you know, British 
government is not doing anything, but we want to go.’
13 The strongest frustration with 
political and command constraints on military agency is expressed in published memoirs 
from the period where strict rules of engagement prevented UNPROFOR from evacuating 
non-wounded civilians, most of all in the case of the British military interpreter Capt Miloš 
Stanković (the son of a Serbian royalist army officer) whose Army career came to an end 
when he was arrested, but never charged, on suspicion of passing information to Bosnian 
Serb forces (Stankovic 2000). Stanković writes scathingly, for instance, of a NATO air strike 
that affected his liaison relationship with Bosnian Serb forces: ‘All this left us in a lousy 
position. Regardless of whether or not a strike had been justified, we’d sent quite contrary 
and conflicting signals to the Serbs. […] From the Serb perspective we, the UN, had lied’ 
(Stankovic 2000: 328).  
Though no interviewee for this project was as bitter as Stanković, several suggested that 
western politicians, the US government or the UN hierarchy had impeded UNPROFOR’s 
ability to protect. Louise, for instance, remarked in comments that seemed to apply both to 
BiH and the site of her next deployment, Rwanda (where she had witnessed the aftermath of 
machete attacks while interpreting for a field ambulance): 
 
If they were outside a UN-designated vehicle or building, we were not allowed to 
engage anything or anyone. It’s their war. Our rules of engagement said, if a spat 
starts off, people start fighting one another, they’re hacking chunks out of one 
another with machetes or shooting each other, you are not allowed to intervene. 
It’s not our war. Very frustrating.
14 
 
A member of the 1992 British reconnaissance party to central Bosnia included in his 
narrative the observation that: 16 
 
we couldn’t get in through Serbia, because the war was too active, and the ethnic 
cleansers  were  presumably  really  too  determined,  and  probably  because  our 
politicians could not seem to find a way forward in terms of being strong enough 
to negotiate, I mean, the western politicians generally.
15 
 
Those serving after Dayton appeared more comfortable with their mission’s rationale, or at 
least did not narrate comments such as the above. The post-Dayton force was of a peace 
enforcement rather than peacekeeping nature, commanded by NATO instead of the UN, and 
Britain’s high commitment to NATO (including regular exercises with other NATO 
militaries) had already won soldiers’ confidence in the organization’s effectiveness. Tony, the 
artillery officer who served shortly after Dayton, narrated the NATO force as more 
appropriate than what had gone before: 
 
[Before  December  1995]  the  British  Army  was  involved  with  the  UN,  in  a 
peacekeeping operation, and I think we didn’t really deploy any heavy guns. My 
regiment had something called the AS-90, which was a self-propelled gun, which 
was probably heavier artillery than they had in theatre, and so once the Dayton 
Peace Agreement had been signed the rationale was to put a more warfighting-
type  army  into  the  field,  into  Bosnia,  to  enforce  peace.  And  therefore  my 
regiment, being one of those types of regiments that would be deployed was then 
put on a readiness to move.
16 
 
 As professionals – an important component of narrators’ military identity – soldiers found 
satisfaction in improving socio-economic relations at the level where their actions and 
choices had immediate effects, the community near their base. Mark, a REME company 17 
commander, took an initiative to improve the local economy and promote social peace by 
hiring local mechanics and carpenters for the base’s workshop. The employment process led 
him to learn in detail about blue-collar work in socialist Yugoslavia and confront the town’s 
mayor (who attempted to monopolize employment for his associates) over the nature of 
political authority; as a symbol of the improvement in local prosperity, he gave the sudden 
availability of superior red wine (Vranac) from Montenegro in the town’s shops.
17 Besides 
core military tasks, soldiers dedicated themselves to work such as repairing or rebuilding 
community buildings (particularly those benefiting children), procuring inexpensive essential 
supplies for teachers, doctors and vulnerable inhabitants, and organizing enjoyable events – 
especially football matches between foreign soldiers and local men. These were usually 
remembered as happy, satisfying occasions, although visits to medical facilities sometimes 
produced uncomfortable encounters between British and ex-Yugoslav norms of healthcare, 
e.g. concerning the treatment of children with learning disabilities.
18 Once BiH had stabilized 
after Dayton, civil affairs officers could pump-prime enterprise projects that could be 
completed within a unit’s six-month tour, cleaving closer to the official discourse of 
development and enabling local people to reconstruct the country themselves. Steve, a 
military colloquial speaker who served near Mrkonjić Grad in 1999, felt that the small tasks 
he was able to perform were the essence of the Army’s mission: 
 
SFOR,  Stabilization  Force,  were  there  to  help  out  people,  to  try  and  get  the 
country back on its feet. And if that’s sorting firewood for an old woman, it’s a 
little step. If that’s sorting out wood for that old woman, that’s a little step. […] 
Used to sort little problems like that out. I mean, they probably wouldn’t change 
the world, but you’re making people’s lives better. By giving them wood-burning 18 
stoves,  by  clearing  a  classroom  out  full  of  pests.  So  the  little  things,  really. 
Interesting work.
19 
 
Short-term quick impact projects, however, have raised concerns on a structural level that 
which those who implement them are rarely in a position to perceive. Béatrice Pouligny has 
found that the funding of these projects may highlight to local actors that the intervening 
force is not in fact committing resources in proportion to its power: 
 
more often than not those small projects do not go beyond superficial repairs to a 
road or the roof of a school or dispensary. These efforts are paltry in relation to 
both  the  needs  and  the  means  deployed  at  the  same  time  for  the  missions 
themselves. Frequently such aid is also resented as an insulting penny in the hat, 
and as proof that much more can be done. (Pouligny 2006: 116) 
 
One interpreter for British forces near Mrkonjić Grad, indeed, recalled taking the brunt of a 
schoolteacher’s frustration with the force’s unfulfilled promises when she interpreted 
between him and the third or fourth British unit to rotate into the area and visit the school: 
 
They would ask, ‘So what do you need?’ For example, ‘What do you need in this 
village?’ And the headmaster would say, ‘Well, OK, we need new desks, and […] 
a blackboard in the school.’ ‘OK, we’ll see what we can do.  I  can’t promise 
anything, but we’ll see what we can do.’ That was, those two sentences, ‘We 
cannot promise anything, but we’ll see.’ And, you know, four months later, six 
months later, you come and they say, ‘So what do you need?’ And the headmaster 
is like, ‘I’ve said this before, but I know you can’t promise anything, but you’ll 19 
do your best, I know, I know.’ And after some time you start to become – I was in 
a few situations very embarrassed, because I felt it’s my responsibility.
20 
 
 Soldiers leaving BiH after a six-month tour did not have the opportunity to observe that, 
even though every military visitor to the school might have found personal satisfaction in his 
or her connection to it, the cumulative impact of repeated visits and commitments from 
representatives of a privileged armed force was not necessarily so welcome locally. The 
significance of individual and structural contribution existed on separate and often conflicting 
levels of experience. 
What of the duty that set the military apart from even the best-resourced and best-
privileged foreign civilians, the duty to kill? Peacekeeping, as the literature acknowledges, 
values liaison and negotiation above warrior skills, threatening the soldierly identities of elite 
troops in particular (Winslow 2004: 9) but not exclusively (Kernic 1999: 122–23). Narratives 
from Bosnia by infantry and cavalry soldiers (the arms with highest expectations of directly 
fighting the enemy) are overshadowed by memories of not being able to take part in combat 
because the UN mandate prevented it or because the violence had already ended. The text 
that most resembles a first-hand memoir of war, with its emphasis on the gulf of 
understanding between those who have and have not experienced combat, is in fact by 
Anthony Loyd, who was no longer a serving soldier when he spent time in BiH. His narrative 
nonetheless finds the most fulfillment at Stara Bila near Vitez, where he was in the company 
of a British battalion, and his non-combatant, non-witness Others include ‘the post-conflict 
generation of journalists and NATO representatives in Sarajevo’ (Loyd 1999: 5), ‘quasi-
academics who were never there’, ‘politicos’ (Loyd 1999: 30), his own girlfriend in London, 
‘columnists who wrote about Bosnia without ever having been there’ (Loyd 1999: 157), a 
sexually attractive female Red Cross worker who mocks his attempt to deheroicize his rescue 
of a child, and the survivor of a UK football stadium disaster who ‘could not tell the 20 
difference between mass murder and accident’ (Loyd 1999: 283). Loyd aligns himself with 
‘most of the other young Light Division officers’ during his Army career who, he relates, 
were fascinated by foreign war as a means of testing their masculinity: 
 
Some were even more vitriolic than me, and came right out with it: ‘We want to 
know what killing is like.’ The words hang in my mind. If you are a young man 
of combat age frustrated by the tedium and meaninglessness of life in twentieth-
century Europe, you may understand them. If not, you will probably think they 
come from a psychopath. (Loyd 1999: 67) 
 
A similar sentiment emerges from Patrick Hennessey’s memoir of Army service in the mid-
2000s, which contains an extremely brief account of a bored and detached six-month tour to 
the routinized Bosnia of several years after Dayton before acknowledging the excitement of 
combat in Afghanistan (Hennessey 2009). In this author’s own study, infantry and cavalry 
were not as well represented as combat support and combat service support corps, in 
particular Army educators. The account closest to the Loyd/Hennessey junior officer 
experience belonged to Tony French, a captain in the Royal Horse Artillery who served in 
BiH in the early implementation phase of Dayton. His initial role as a forward observation 
officer put him conceptually ‘at the front line identifying targets’ but once it became clear 
artillery use would not be necessary he was given liaison responsibilities which he found 
significantly more boring, as his narrative imagined explaining to a replacement:  
 
But to be honest from my perspective it was like… actually very dull now, and I 
would think, ‘All you’re going to be doing is rebuilding the local school.’ Which, 
you  know,  fantastic,  actually,  and  would  give  you  an  awful  lot  of  sense  of 21 
achievement, I think, to do something like that, rather than just… doing what I 
did,  I  think,  was,  near  the  end  it  was  just  deathly  boring  and  quite  sad,  sad, 
completely.
21  
 
The narratives collected by this author exhibited a marked silence when it came to the 
soldierly work of combat, and even more so of killing – although in terms of the narrators’ 
own roles and in terms of their force’s mission, combat was not what most of them had been 
sent to do.  
For many soldiers – especially those bored by the realities of their duties in BiH – the most 
distinct memories of BiH lay in off-duty time, when they had the most freedom to experience 
the country (Tony, who engaged in frequent leisure travel after his role change, described 
himself as ‘turning into a military tourist’
22). British soldiers were usually permitted to 
socialize in town and were allowed up to two cans of beer a day while off duty – unlike US 
troops whose stricter force protection regulations restricted them to base and to drinking non-
alcoholic ‘near beer’ – and their accounts of off-base leisure thus often involved a semi-
licensed loosening of behavioral boundaries. A memoir by Monty Woolley, a cavalry 
lieutenant attached to The Cheshire Regiment in 1993, locates much of the action in Tuzla, 
where a small force spent quite some time away from the main base at Vitez. Woolley’s 
account of Tuzla nightlife in the alluring but platonic company of two female interpreters 
culminates at a farewell party organized by one interpreter’s father, the mayor. His self-
deprecating exaggeration of a junior officer’s military masculinity (and vanity), having even 
playfully taken on some of the local military hypermasculinity, becomes a serious 
appreciation of genuine military values in comparison to the status-seeking civilian world:
23  
 22 
Having  entered  the  club  dressed  in  my  issue  combats,  I  had  stripped  off  my 
winter  layers  down  to  a  black  polar-neck  top  that  I  often  wore  to  annoy  the 
squadron leader. Strategically strapped around my chest was the black leather 
shoulder holster I had bought from a local man in Vitez. In it was my loaded 
Browning 9mm pistol. Needless to say I enjoyed this slightly surreal and certainly 
unique opportunity, even if I did look a pratt, and ensured the event was recorded 
on film. And that was what this was, just an opportunity for fun, not some sad 
childhood ambition to be the Milk Tray man, no certainly not, for at school I had 
had a pathological fear for the swimming-pool’s top diving board! 
 
At  first  I  felt  self-conscious  because  I  knew  what  most  were  thinking,  but 
knowing the chance was unlikely to arise again, I made the most of it. The next 
nightclub I was likely to patronize would be in London and not the sort where 
pistols are handed in at the door. The clubs that I frequented were in Fulham and 
typically the hunting-ground of city boys. They  were easy to identify as they 
would arrive dressed in stripy suits carrying filo-faxes having  continued from 
their offices to pubs then clubs; rather a sad highlight in the day of a young man. 
Nevertheless,  as  we  UN  soldiers  slugged  local  bottled  beer  in  Bosnia  while 
swarming around only a handful of local women, they were in the same London 
clubs  impressing  girls  with  bottles  of  chilled  Champagne  and  cocktails  at 
exorbitant prices. They had GTIs and BMWs to drive girls back to their flats in; I 
had to share a Bedford truck with drunken soldiers then retire to a smelly sleeping 
bag. Nothing would have persuaded me to change places; this life, I believed, was 
much more fun. (Woolley 2004: 125) 
 23 
For Woolley, however, Tuzla was a false climax. After returning to Vitez, he would be part 
of the first group of British soldiers to attend the aftermath of the horrific massacre at Ahmići, 
where Bosnian Croat troops had destroyed a mixed village by burning Bosniak villagers alive.  
Socializing with local women also appeared in some interviews as a source of danger. 
Tony, who had served in one of the RS’s tensest areas, illustrated his paranoia about 
interpreters from that locale with an account of how he came to trust one interpreter after his 
fears about a trap proved unfounded: an interpreter had told him about a new pizzeria, ‘but I 
was so suspicious I just thought it was a trap, I thought we were going to turn up and we were 
going to get slotted’, therefore he came to the pizzeria in an armored vehicle.
24 Another 
junior officer in a different unit had once slept with his radio turned in case a fellow officer, 
meeting a young attractive female kitchen hand after hours at the unit’s civil affairs house, 
got into trouble and needed to request assistance. These anxieties should be set in a long 
context of sexual relations between foreign soldiers and local people being framed as a source 
of danger for the soldier: the training of male (but not female) SOE personnel, for instance, 
had included a simulation of seduction by female enemy agents to assess whether a man was 
at risk of revealing his real identity (Pattinson 2007: 72–3). Such fears still coexisted with 
what Cynthia Enloe (1990: 28) describes as a masculine touristic ideology based on the 
essentialization of local women as sexual objects: ‘If the women are of a different culture, the 
male tourist feels he has entered a region where he can shed civilization’s constraints, where 
he is freed from standards of behaviour imposed by respectable women back home.’ For male 
soldiers at least, the tension between these ideologies contributed to the perceived excitement 
of temporary presence in a conflict zone.  
In parallel to the exotic elements of leisure time in BiH, off-duty experiences also reflected 
the mundane qualities of tourism in a non-English-speaking country where food, drink, 
consumer goods and services (including sex) were startlingly cheap. George had been able to 24 
buy cheap pirate CDs from a stall outside the gates of his base (although hindsight drawn 
from a later tour in Iraq, where he had been told insurgents used music and software piracy to 
fund their activities, now made him think differently about the practice). In Split, Louise and 
Geoffrey had both had to deal with the aftermath of incidents where drunken soldiers had 
come into contact with Croatian law enforcement. Geoffrey’s avuncular account described 
the misbehavior of Croatian soldiers within British military space: he had reported four drunk 
soldiers in a stolen car to British military police, but: 
 
the policeman rang up and he said – most disappointed – he said Croatian Army 
got  there  first,  and  we  were  there  in  time  to  see  them  all  being  led  away  in 
handcuffs  (laughs).  Croatian  Army  don’t  mess  about,  you  know.  Guilty  as 
charged, come here!
25 
 
The prospects of a Briton receiving authority to exert discipline over foreign soldiers and of 
violence against these men by their own military police are both neutralized in this narrative 
by a humorous tone that frames it among one of many amusing incidents from Divulje 
Barracks. To think through the full implications of their arrest, which are instead displaced 
into the comment that the ‘Croatian Army don’t mess about’, would undoubtedly have 
disrupted the narrator’s preferred account of his service as ‘what I call a Mediterranean 
holiday with pay’.
26 Louise, in contrast, came closer to filling the silence in her account 
(again framed as the narrative of an older and responsible female captain) of attending a 
reverse situation involving soldiers from an allied contingent:  
 
I was driven by the RMP, the military police, I think a sergeant and a corporal, 
into Split. To the police headquarters. Where I had been on a number of occasions 25 
to talk with the Croatian chief of police, whom I didn’t like but I had to woo, and 
he used to give me slivovitz at nine o’clock in the morning and I used to have to 
drink it. And he used to touch me on the thigh, and all that sort of business, all 
very unpleasant, but because I had to be a diplomat, and that was my role, I just 
had to grin and bear it, put up with it. […]  
 
What had happened was two Scandinavian soldiers, I forget whether they were 
Swedish, Swedish / Norwegian, had just deployed, realized how cheap the beer 
was. ’Cause you know Scandinavian countries are very expensive [places] to live, 
and alcohol is very expensive. Well, they went out and got absolutely drunk, stole 
a Croatian military police car, crashed it, badly. I saw it, I saw the wreck. Now 
they were both sitting there in front of me, their injuries were partly consistent 
with having been in a road traffic accident, and partly consistent with having had 
an absolutely thorough pasting from the Croatian military police. They had been 
battered to bloody pulps. They were incoherent. I know they were probably still 
drunk. I wanted to get them out, and I wanted to take care of them, take them 
back to the British camp, where we could find out where their unit was and get 
them collected, ’cause I wasn’t sure they were going to last until the morning. 
And they wouldn’t let me have them. That was an awkward G5 [civil–military 
cooperation] situation, which I couldn’t win, all I could do was report it.
27 
  
The temporal setting of Louise’s account (wartime 1993 not 1998) and her own physical 
presence after the arrest leaves no space for a humorous conclusion, yet illustrates the limited 
power of a foreign army captain serving as a liaison officer and interpreter vis-à-vis the 
coercive power of the host state.  26 
Boredom, in the eyes of base commanders and chaplains, was the enemy of discipline. 
Mark, an officer with a remarkable personal commitment to languages, had used ad hoc 
classes in the local language as a means of keeping soldiers occupied and preventing alcohol 
abuse. Bases that had been in place for several years also tended to acquire leisure facilities 
installed and left behind by various battlegroups, thus George remembered his base had had a 
gym and even a sauna in a building with a beach mural on the lobby wall: ‘everybody liked to 
say, you know, go down to the beach, get massive.’
28 For George, however, travel imposed 
obligations as well as pleasures. George (like Mark, his former commanding officer) 
frequently commented on the importance of Britons learning foreign languages. His 
explanation segued from the example of friendly military patrols in an Arabic-speaking 
country to the image of monolingual British holidaymakers in Spain, from the standpoint that 
a small amount of linguistic knowledge could serve as credible proof of good intentions: 
 
I still believe, I suppose altruistically, that we are as an army a force for good, 
we’re trying to do the right thing for people. It may not always come across that 
way, but I still firmly believe that the best thing we can do is, when we’re in a 
country somewhere, is, you know, take your helmet off, take your sunglasses off, 
take your glove off and go and shake somebody by the hand. Whether it’s, you 
know, waving at us on the street, going ‘Salaam aleikum,’ or when they say that 
to  you,  ‘Aleikum  salaam.’  […]  [I]t  doesn’t  really  matter  whether  you’re  an 
occupying force, whether you’re a peacekeeping force, or actually whether you’re 
on holiday, in somebody’s country. I mean, you look at the service you get if you 
go to Spain on holiday, and  you  can  actually sort of ask for  a few things in 
Spanish, they think it’s fantastic. Whereas if you go ‘Egg and chips mate’, you 27 
know… you get the same old stuff thrown on your plate, and it’s probably been 
recycled from the bin.
29  
 
Going home 
 
Soldiers deployed with their unit typically spent six months in BiH, traveling and returning as 
a group – the British Army’s standard, expected model of operational deployment. The 
system differed for individuals who deployed on attachment to a different unit, such as 
officers who came forward for headquarters posts, non-Army personnel gaining operational 
experience as civil affairs or press officers with Army units, and military colloquial speakers 
and interpreters. Most of these also served six-month tours but arrived and departed at 
different times from their hosts. The most highly skilled military interpreters, perhaps the 
scarcest resource of all, often found themselves serving much longer than six months. The 
interpreters Miloš Stanković, Nick Ilić and Nick Stansfield all spent a year or more in 
UNPROFOR, and several years later a half-Serbian Territorial Army Engineers officer was 
mobilized from mid-2000 to mid-2002 (comprising bomb disposal roles at two headquarters, 
refresher language training and a military interpreter tour) with only a six-or seven-month 
break.  
A ‘handover takeover’ of approximately ten days required public-facing officers to pass 
on their experiences, tips and contacts; military interpreters, similarly, might advise their 
relief of important vocabulary for the job that Army language training had not covered. Units 
had to pack up equipment they had brought into ‘theatre’ so that it could be shipped back to 
Britain (or Germany), ensure the good condition of equipment that belonged permanently to 
the British military formation in the area, and audit their stores and accounts. Soldiers who 
had completed their individual handovers remained at a loose end until it was their turn to 28 
join a transport home. New liaison officers would still take time to rebuild interpersonal 
relationships with their contacts. Local interpreters who had worked at one base for several 
years frequently mentioned in their own interviews that incoming officers would almost 
without fail ask them for advice about the local area or the best negotiating strategies to use 
with local officials.  
Troop rotation caused some difficulties for Bosnian officials who suddenly encountered 
new post-holders every six months, for enthusiastic liaison officers who felt they could have 
had more impact by staying in post, and for permanent civilian supervisors in some offices 
who could not easily follow up allegations against local civilian employees. However, in the 
fast-changing Bosnian political environment it allowed tired soldiers to be replaced by fresh 
personnel whose expectations would not be based on previous hostile and threatening 
encounters. Tony’s experience in a tense Serb-controlled area shortly after Dayton hinted at 
one reason why rotation was necessary:  
 
I think if I had been asked to stay and help rebuild, I just – I couldn’t have done 
that. I would have found it very difficult to motivate me and my soldiers. Who, 
you know … had been shot at, and all kinds of stuff.
30 
 
Rotation also guarded against the risk of liaison officers becoming over-close to their 
opposite numbers, and made what the military saw as an acceptable compromise between 
operations and family life. A formed unit leaving theatre could look forward to a period of 
unofficial or official ‘decompression’ and debriefing, and a brief resumption of family life 
while on leave, before coming back to prepare for the unit’s next exercise or deployment. 
Attached personnel, on the other hand, very often felt that they had missed out by finishing 
their tours as individuals. Miloš Stanković (2000: 205) wrote that he had only had five days 29 
between leaving BiH in November 1993 and starting a two-year staff tour of Northern Ireland: 
although this contravened the mandatory three weeks’ leave, he felt that ‘a single capbadge 
individual’ on attachment would always fall through the cracks. Individual attachments in 
this study felt similarly. Louise explained that members of a formed unit underwent ‘an 
enforced period of self-debriefing’ between the end of a deployment and their individual 
leave, yet she had left halfway through her host battalion’s tour. She had missed serving with 
people she already knew and was also left unable to take part in the expected military practice 
of remembering the deployment with friends who had also been there, meaning that the 
attachment system had effectively shattered the regimental foundation on which the British 
Army was normatively based.
31 
Ten to fifteen years, in most cases, had elapsed between the interview narrators leaving 
BiH and their producing a narrative of linguistic/cultural contact and travel. The passage of 
time, and exposure to news of what had become of BiH’s constitutional settlement (no further 
armed conflict, yet continued suspicion between the two entities), did not always facilitate a 
composed perspective on the value of the force’s mission in BiH. When interviewed in 2010, 
George’s reflections on the length and nature of Britain’s deployment were still divided: 
 
We were there really to help them stand on their own two feet, and what we 
ended up being is we ended up being more like a welfare agency that kind of 
perpetuated the problems for a little bit. I don’t… it’s a very very harsh sort of 
generalised judgement. I know there was a lot of good work going on in different 
areas, but I think if we’d have managed to pull ourselves away from there sooner, 
that may have actually enabled the Bosnians, or forced them, more appropriately, 
to kind of stand on their own two feet, but at the same time recognising that there 
is a huge amount of suppressed ethnic tensions in that particular area. You know, 30 
maybe we had to stay for as long as we did, and, you know, with the Kosovo 
thing as well.
32 
 
Framed this way, the account cannot reconcile concerns about the international community’s 
long-term effects with an understanding of BiH as a place where ethnic demography poses a 
continued risk of violence that would require and justify an extended foreign military 
presence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The title of this paper comes from a provocative question posed by one of more than twenty 
interpreters from former Yugoslavia who contributed interviews to Languages at War. Jovana 
had been studying mathematics and computing in Belgrade before she was offered an 
interpreting job with British forces at Mrkonjić Grad (in which capacity she met the 
headmaster in the extract above). She enjoyed making friends with her shiftmates and 
learning details of regional British cultures and accents but became upset with the superior 
attitude towards Bosnian society on the part of soldiers who believed that BiH’s 
disadvantages stemmed from endemic backwardness rather than the consequences of a 
devastating war. Ultimately, she questioned whether foreigners who had failed to broaden 
their experiences beyond the insulated and familiar context of their own military base could 
even claim to have ‘been in Bosnia’ at all: 
 
So I think it’s just a lack of education, information, and that kind of ignorant 
attitude, ‘we are better.’ ‘Oh! I’ve been in Bosnia!’ ‘Oh, where’ve you been [for] 
six months in Bosnia?’ It’s all just, ‘Oh, I had two tours in Bosnia.’ ‘So where’ve 31 
you been?’ ‘Oh, in Mrkonjić Grad.’ ‘Have  you ever left a camp apart [from] 
going on patrol? Have you ever been, you know?’ ‘No.’ […] [S]o, ‘You know 
Mrkonjić Grad area? You don’t even know Bosnia? And you’re telling me that 
you were, you know, in Bosnia?’ It’s just, I think that’s, not being educated, not 
being informed.
33 
 
Interpreters were natives of the country where British soldiers traveled (if not originally 
from BiH then certainly from Yugoslavia), and continuously employed in places where 
Britons spent only six months at a time. Their own accounts of working with the British 
necessarily introduced different dimensions of the job, from the in-jokes they as native 
speakers could work into OPTAG training to the boredom and frustration that could 
eventually arise from revisiting the same organization with different liaison officers and 
making the same promises to the same authority figure. The worst drivers they encountered 
were irresponsible young Britons. Interpreters, more than the British, remarked on the 
strangeness of soldiers splitting ‘home’ between the UK and Germany (the site of many 
units’ peacetime bases, where many soldiers had children and wives). The job of building and 
enforcing peace in BiH played a much more prominent role in interpreters’ life stories than it 
did for most British soldiers, and was inseparable, of course, from the war’s consequences for 
their own selves, societies and families.  
Every oral history is necessarily partial, grounded in a specific location and time and 
structured by the narrator’s role, personality, preconceptions and hindsight. The subjectivity 
of a junior officer from London, an engineer from Scotland or a student from Belgrade will 
necessarily affect what a person chooses to remember and tell, just as the subjectivity of a 
young civilian academic from south-east England will have affected what the author as a 
researcher has chosen to ask and write. The interviews collected for Languages at War 32 
necessarily included narratives, prompted by the interviewer, of pre-deployment language 
briefings and on- and off-duty experiences of working with interpreters; languages were 
marginal in another oral history project (on British forces at Goražde) by the late journalist 
Gillian Sandford (GMS Media 2001), though this collection too produced a composite travel 
narrative with tropes of arrival, service and departure. The precedents of travel writing and 
tourist expectations continue to structure new narratives of travel to the Balkans, even though 
an oral history interview will usually produce them through layers of retellings and responses 
rather than an uninterrupted linear narrative. 
Many unthinking soldiers had to be shocked into marveling at the level of development in 
BiH, though others – and not only graduate linguists – strove to find out more about the 
country, ask about puzzling observations from patrols and build on whatever amount of the 
local language they had been able to learn. The participants in an oral history project about 
languages and peacekeeping would naturally tend to fall into the second group. While 
disproportionately representing certain branches of the Army, particularly the former Royal 
Army Educational Corps, this collection is of significance to understanding the military 
precisely because it represents a diversity of military occupations beyond the combat arms, 
the focal points of published memoir. Juliette Pattinson (2007: 5) has recognized the 
limitations of published autobiographies in a SOE context: publishers have favored dramatic 
action and conformity to existing narrative conventions, while women rarely represent 
themselves. The privileged perspectives in British military travel memoirs of BiH are those of 
the commanding officer (Stewart 1993; Rose 1998; Barry 2008) and of the junior infantry or 
cavalry officer as would-be combatant (Woolley 2004; Hennessey 2009) or as witness (Loyd 
1999; Stankovic 2000), reflecting the subjectivity of a particular age cohort and gender. The 
narratives of soldiers in combat support and combat service support arms, still conceptualized 33 
as behind-the-lines corps whose experiences do not lend themselves well to publishable 
drama, may help to broaden popular memory and understanding of what soldiering involves. 
The constraints and legacies of existing models of travel narrative nonetheless permeate 
even narratives of growing in linguistic and cultural competence through travel. This is at its 
most evident in the trope of entry to theatre, which follows conventions of narrating British 
travel-on-a-mission that date back to at least the 19th century, and in the scene-setting 
introductions or conclusions with which military narrators explain the conflict. The course of 
entry narratives is strikingly similar to the Comaroffs’, with coastal enclaves still existing as a 
leisure site to which one may temporarily return during the stay and through which one will 
exit – although the narratives may be complicated and unsettled by disturbance and violence 
within the coastal site itself. The traveled landscape, if not quite empty, is still seen as 
completely devastated, with an emphasis on destruction and complete atomization rather than 
on what social structures exist, and with two linked simplified assumptions: (a) that conflict 
is a natural result of ethnic difference in this region; (b) that ethnic difference, rather than 
proximate political and criminal acts by identifiable individuals, explains the conflict. The 
short tours, familiarized base environments and regulated contacts with local society appear 
to prevent soldiers from perceiving the strategies, negotiations and compromises that emerge 
from ethnographic narratives by anthropologists committed to long and repeated stays in 
local neighborhoods (a practice that the idea of stationing liaison officers in so-called ‘LOT 
houses’ within town centers appears to mimic).
34 The acquisition of such a gaze depended on 
long stays of an indefinite duration, in conditions of shared risks and shared lacks of privilege, 
and on a relationship of trust that a declared and uniformed representative of a foreign armed 
force would rarely, if ever, be able to achieve. One pessimistic conclusion would therefore be 
to view any soldier’s attempt to gain understanding as fundamentally inadequate. Another, 
slightly more heartening, resolution is to welcome rather than dismiss these efforts while 34 
recognizing that they are constrained and sometimes even invalidated by the structure, 
character and aims of the military institution today.   
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